di balah balah patigo si rauik pambalah rotan luhak di baginyo tigo adat di baginyo salapan nan ampek tabang ka langik nan ampek tingga di dunia nan ampek tabang ka langik: aso bulan, duo mantari, tigo timua, ampek salatan; nan ampek tingga di dunia: rumah gadang, lumbuang bapereng, sawah gadang, banda buatan like rattan a knife has cut into thirds, the homeland is tripartite; the law is divided into eight; four flew to the heavens four remained on earth the four flying skyward were the moon and the sun, the East and the South; the four staying on earth were the longhouse and the granary, the rice fields and the irrigation canals From L. C. Westenenk, De Minangkabausche Nagari
Introduction
In the late 1970s Indonesia was the world's largest importer of rice. By 1984, it had attained rice self-sufficiency. This remarkable achievement was the result of favorable weather and a concerted effort on the part of the government to develop rice agriculture both on Java, the largest rice-producing area in the country, and elsewhere. West Suma tra, as one of the major rice-producing areas outside Java, has played an important part in this drive for national self-sufficiency in rice. Average yields for wet rice in the province are listed as approximately 4.4 tons per hectare.1 These high rice yields are due not only to West Sumatra's favorable climatic conditions for wet-rice cultivation, but also to the progressive development of numerous small-scale irrigation works through a combination of farmer initiative and government assistance.
Recent efforts to improve irrigation in West Sumatra are only the latest in a long se ries of technical, political, and economic developments which have affected agriculture there. A number of studies have traced some of these political and economic changes, but with the exception of the coffee industry, little attention has been paid to the histori cal development of West Sumatra's agriculture, and none has been devoted specifically to irrigation. This lacuna is unfortunate, as irrigated sawah has long been the mainstay of agricultural production in the d arek, the montane cultural homeland of the Minangkabau people. Drawing on historical and contemporary sources, this study at tempts to give a preliminary history of irrigation in West Sumatra in order to examine the roles of the state and of farmers in developing what has today become a highly pro ductive rice cultivation system. 
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Early History of Rice Cultivation and Irrigation
Oral Legend
Minangkabau legend says that when people began to populate the three luhak of the darek (Agam, Tanah Datar, and Limapuluh Kota), wet-rice cultivation was an early fea ture of their livelihood.2 dibuek sawah gadang satampang baniah makan urang tigo luhak3 they made vast sawah and spread it with seed, this was the food of the people of the three luhak In Pariangan in western Tanah Da tar, according to oral tradition, these early inhabi tants established the first Minangkabu nagari (village), an essential Minangkabau so ciopolitical-economic-territorial unit. This is presumed to have occurred in the twelfth to thirteenth centuries. According to legend, the pre-Islamic nagari needed at a mini mum the following: basawah baladang bataratak bapanyabuangan badusun bagalanggang baitiak baayam baanak bakamanakan bakabau bakambiang batabek taman-taman bakorong bakampuang bacupak bagantang baradat balimbago bataratak bakapalo koto4 * Here the importance of agriculture is clear, as is the distinction between wet agricul ture and dry agriculture. While these legends do not allow us to specify the beginnings of irrigated agriculture in West Sumatra, they do suggest that irrigation there has both a long history and an enduring importance.
wet fields and dry fields settlements and cockpits neighborhoods and open fields ducks and chickens children and nieces waterbuffalo and goats fishponds and gardens neighborhoods and villages customs, rules and institutions clearings and water sources
Archaeological and Linguistic Evidence
The historical record is vague about the origins of the Minangkabau and rice cultiva tion. Neolithic artifacts dating from as early as 2000 BC have been found in the Kerinci area along the southern border of West Sumatra. Later, peoples from China and central Indo-China came during a second migration of peoples to insular Southeast Asia around 2A longer version of this legend can be found in Taufik Abdullah, "Modernization in the Minangkabau World," in Culture and Politics in Indonesia, ed. Claire Holt et al. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972 ), pp. 183-86. 3Idrus Hakimy, 1000 Pepatah-petitih, mamang-bidal, pantun-gurindam (Bandung: Remadja Karya, 1984 , p.
68.
4L. C. Westenenk, De Minangkabausche nagari, Mededeelingen van het Bureau voor de Bestuurszaken der
Buitenbezittingen, Aflevering XVII, 3rd. ed. (Weltevreden: Visser, 1918), p. 12. 1500-2000 BC.5 These people already had a vocabulary which included huma (cultivated field), tebu (sugarcane), alu (pestle), and padi (rice plant).6 These migrants may have in troduced dry-rice cultivation to Indonesia.7
Wet-rice cultivation is generally presumed to have been introduced to Sumatra from Java by the Hindu-Javanese8 or directly from India, along with the plow, cotton, and the spinning wheel*9 The first Hindu settlements on the Sumatran coasts date from approximately AD 200.
Early Trade and Political Organization
There are no clues as to the state of rice cultivation until the twelfth to thirteenth century when Indian traders entered West Sumatra from the west.10 By the mid-four teenth century they had established their own separate political-commercial center at Pariangan in the heart of the darek.11 It may be presumed that, at least by this time, irri gation was spreading under the Indians, although it certainly could have been practiced earlier.
By 1339, the eastern Minangkabau rantau (fringe territories)12 and part of the eastern darek had come under the control of Adityawarman, a ruler of Sumatran-Javanese parentage with ties to both the Sriwijayan empire in South Sumatra/Jambi and to the Majapahit empire in Java. At this time, gold and iron mining were already important in the central region of Tanah Da tar,13 suggesting that agriculture may have been produc ing a surplus for a non-agricultural population. However, control of the gold trade, not 3 R. Heine-Geldern, "The Archaeology and Art of Sumatra/' in E. Loeb, Sumatra, Its History and People (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982) , pp. 305-31. Although Heine-Geldern's "two-wave" theory of migration to Southeast Asia is not confirmed, some recent linguistic work supports the thesis (Nordhofer, 1984, personal communication) . 6R. Blust, "Austronesian Culture History: Some Linguistic Inferences and Their Relations to the Archeological Record," in Miscellaneous Studies in Indonesian and Languages in Indonesia, Part III, ed. Soepomo Poedjosoedarmo (Jakarta: Badan Penyelenggara Seri NUSA, 1977) , p. 28. Rice grains dating back 6,000 years have been found on Sulawesi. See A. Whitten et. al., The Ecology of Sumatra (Yogyakarta: Gadja Mada Uni versity Press, 1984) , p. 64. 7Heine-Geldern, "Archaeology and Art," p. 307. 8 See L. C. Westenenk, "Opstellen over Minangkabau II," Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde (henceforth TBG) 57 (1916) C h ristin e Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant Economy: Central Sumatra, 1784 -1847 (London: Curzon, 1983 , p. 61. 12Minangkabau culture also predominates in Bangkinang and the upper reaches of the Siak and Kampar Kiri rivers, which today lie in Riau but are considered part of the eastern Minangkabau rantau. Both the east ern and west coast rantau are more precisely termed rantau dakek, or "close rantau." "Close" here distin guishes them from the rantau jauah, or "far rantau" in which Minangkabau would form a minority of the inhabitants. Although the rantau was populated by Minangkabau, it was never a colony of the darek. Social structure in rantau territories has always been more hierarchical, especially after the subjugation of much of the coastal rantau by the Acehnese in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 13Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism, p. 63. of agriculture, was the economic bulwark of Adityawarman's rule.14 Although he must have been familiar with the concept of irrigation from his experience on Java,15 * there is no direct evidence that he promoted irrigation in the darekM However, the probability is high that by the the fourteenth century irrigated rice cultivation was spreading in high land West Sumatra under the influence of Adityawarman in eastern Tanah Datar and of the Indians in western Tanah Datar.
Whatever their roles in irrigation development, neither Adityawarman nor the In dians constituted a centralized authority able to undertake large irrigation works. The topography of West Sumatra allows for the development of many small systems and does not necessitate large irrigation works with correspondingly large command areas. This has enabled irrigation production systems to be relatively independent and small in scale, without the need for a large superordinant political structure to organize the con struction and maintenance of the physical systems and provide political stability for their operation. The decentralized production base in West Sumatra did not encourage the development of centralized rule, in contradistinction to Java, and it contributed to the viability of semi-autonomous nagari rule. After Adityawarman's death, his weakened dynasty appears to have had little control over the administration of nagari affairs.17 Irri gation matters were probably handled by the nagari, to the extent that any group beyond the irrigators themselves was involved.
Lack of evidence precludes speculation on the state of irrigation during the centuries immediately following Adityawarman's time. By the seventeenth century, however, we may infer its state in West Sumatra by examining what was happening in Malaya across the Straits of Malacca. Beginning in the fifteenth century, significant numbers of mi grants from West Sumatra moved to the west coast of Malaysia. Many settled in Negeri Sembilan, which in the late eighteenth century was closely linked culturally and politi cally with Minangkabau.18 14Ibid., p. 62. Claims that Adityawarman emphasized the agricultural sector (see DPK, Sejarah Sumatera Barat [Jakarta: DP&K, 1978] , p. 46) are suspect, given that he situated his capital in the heart of the gold-pro ducing regions, not in the major rice-producing regions. Note also that the inscription on his gravestone, "kanakamedinindra," means "king of the gold-bearing lands." See H. Kern, "Grafsteenopschrift van Koeboer Radja," Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indie (henceforth BK I) 67 (1913) : 401-4. 15The earliest known irrigation structure in Indonesia is the Harinjing weir in East Java mentioned in an inscription dated AD 804. See Abdullah Angoedi, Sejarah irigasi di Indonesia 1 (Jakarta: Komite Nasional Indonesia, International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage, 1985) , p. 28. Irrigation systems are also mentioned in fourteenth century inscriptions from the Singosari Dynasty in East Java. See T. Pigeaud, java in the 14th Century (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963) . 15In Saruaso a stone stele from Adityawarman's time was found by the side of an irrigation canal today called "Banda Bapahek," "The Chiseled Canal." The inscription has not been translated (See, P. Hardjowardjojo, Adiyawarman, Sebuah studi tentang tokoh nasional dari abad XIV [Jakarta: Bhatara, 1966] , pp. 21-22), making it difficult to tell what relationship this stele may have to the irrigation system itself. Other inscriptions from Adityawarman's time deal only with religion, kingship, and genealogy, so it is unlikely that this one deals directly with irrigation. Cf. Satyawati Suleiman, 'The Archaeology and History of West Sumatra," Bulletin of the Research Centre of Archaeology of Indonesia, No. 12 (Jakarta: Pusat Penelitian Purbakala dan Peninggalan Nasional, 1977), p. 5. 17The rule of the dynasty was most centralized during its first seventy years. In 1409, an expedition sent by the Majapahit empire to bring the renegade kingdom to heel attacked the Pagarruyung kingdom. Although the Pagarruyung forces prevailed, the attack apparently weakened the monarchic forces and precipitated a re turn to primarily nagari rule. See DPK, Sejarah Sumatera Barat, Considerable numbers of Minangkabau had already settled in the region by the early seventeenth century and may have been the dominant ethnic group in the state up to two centuries before that. From 1770 until Although at that time, the Malays in peninsular Malaysia planted only dry rice, irri gation appears to have been widespread among the Minangkabau migrants in the inland valleys of Negeri Sembilan.19 Because neighboring areas (Malacca, Kelantan, Trengganu, and Pahang) cultivated primarily unirrigated rice, it appears likely that the irrigation technology of the Minangkabau in Malaya was brought over from the darek in West Sumatra, not initially developed locally.2® As recently as the late nineteenth century, in Malacca it was only the Minangkabau who irrigated rice; the Malaccans themselves re lied entirely on the southwest monsoon to water their rice crop.21 Thus, certainly by the 1700s it appears that irrigation had become such an integral part of Minangkabau culture that Minangkabau emigrants transferred it to their new homes as well.
From 1803 to 1833 the darek was embroiled in civil war stemming from a politicalreligious confrontation between a fundamentalist Islamic group called the Padri and the more syncretist groups tied to traditional elite families and to the court at Pagarruyung. During this period of proselytization by the sword, slave raiding, crop burning, and trade route closures were common, suggesting that conditions were temporarily unfavorable for cultivating irrigated and non-irrigated fields alike. In some Padri areas, such as Lintau in eastern Tanah Datar, irrigation development took place under the direction of Padri war commanders (hulubalang), but these were only incremental improvements to existing irrigation. Christine Dobbin gives an excellent account of the turmoil of these years in her Islamic Revivalism. The Dutch, who from the mid-1600s had established themselves as traders on the western coast, soon proceeded to subdue the Padri and ad vance their own colonial designs. The Dutch territorial conquest of West Sumatra, com pleted in 1837, restored the civil stability necessary for productive sazvah cultivation, but it carried the price of village autonomy and ushered in the first era of major state inter vention in agriculture.
Early Travelers' References to Sawah
The first European to reach the darek was Thomas Dias, a Portuguese emissary in the employ of the Dutch governor of Malacca. He entered the region from the east in 1684, emerging in Lintau in eastern Tanah Datar after an arduous journey through moun tainous jungle.22 Dias mentions gold panning and agriculture as the principal occupa tions in Tanah Datar, but gives no details on agriculture, as he was more interested in political conditions at Kumanis, the seat of the royal family at the time. His mention of a population of 8,000 at Kumanis and of 3,000 armed soldiers sent by the king to see him off suggest, however, that agriculture in the region was sustaining a substantial number of people even three hundred years ago.23
In the late eighteenth century William Marsden gave descriptions of sawah and padi ladatig cultivation in Sumatra.24 With regard to sawah, he mentions that irrigation was sometimes used:
Sawahs are plantations of padi in low, wet ground, which, during the growth of the crop, in the rainy season between the months of October and March, are for the most part overflowed to a depth of six inches or a foot, beyond which latter the water be comes prejudicial. Leve marshes, of firm bottom, under a moderate stratum of mud, and not liable to deep stagnant water, are the situations preferred; the narrower hol lows, though very commonly used for small plantations, being more liable to acci dents from torrents and too great depth of water, which the inhabitants have rarely industry enough to regulate to advantage by permanent embankments. They are not, however, ignorant of such expedients, and works are sometimes met with, con structed for the purpose, chiefly, of supplying the deficiency of rain to several ad joining sawahs, by means of sluices, contrived with no small degree of skill and attention to levels.. . .
. . . Through these apertures [anicuts] water is also, in some instances, introduced from adjacent rivers or reservoirs, where such exist, and the season requires their aid. The innumerable springs and rivulets with which this country abounds, render unnecessary the laborious process by which water is raised and supplied to the rice grounds in the western part of India, where the soil is sandy: yet still the principal art of the planter consists, and is required, in the management of this article; to furnish it to the ground in proper and moderate quantities, and to carry it off from time to time by drains; for if suffered to be long stagnant, it would occasion the grain to ro t25
The first Westerner known to have entered the darek from the west was Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles. In 1818, during the British interregnum in West Sumatra (1795-1819), he journeyed inland from Padang to Pagarruyung near Batusangkar.26 Raffles made the first detailed observations on the state of agriculture in West Sumatra. Excerpts from his diary reveal that he was impressed with the sophistication of agricultural techniques in the darek-in this case near Solok:
. . . we had a gratifying view of the Tiga-blas country, an extensive and highly culti vated plain, bounded to the south by the noble mountain of Talang. . . . The whole of the plain, or valley, (I hardly know which to call it,) occupied by the Tiga-blas Cotas, or Thirteen Confederate Towns, is one sheet of cultivation; in breadth it may be about ten, and in length twenty miles, thickly studded with towns and villages, some of them running in a connected line for several miles. . . . On the slopes of the hills, the principal cultivation is coffee, indigo, maize, sugar-cane, and the oil-giving plants; on the plain below, almost exclusively rice. The sawas, or rice-fields, are here managed exactly on the principle of the mountain sawas in Java, and the soil and produce seem equally good. . . . The Tiga-blas country has always been famed for its 23Ibid., pp. 341-44. An English account of Dias' remarkable journey can be found in E. Schnitger, Forgotten Kingdoms in Sumatra (Leiden: Brill, 1939 produce in gold; indeed to Europeans it has been known as a gold country alone. To find it also in a high degree agricultural was more than I expected . . . many parts re minded us of the beautiful district of Serayu, the pride of Java.27
Raffles goes on to paint in glowing terms a picture of Tanah Datar and the southern slopes of Mt. Merapi:
The whole side of the mountain, for about fifteen miles from Pageruyong in every direction, being covered with villages and rice-fields. . . . The whole country, from Pageruyong as far as the eye could distinctly trace, was one continued scene of culti vation, interspersed with innumerable towns and villages, shaded by the cocoa-nut and other fruit trees. I may safely say, that this view equalled any thing I ever saw in Java; the scenery is more majestic and grand, population equally dense, cultivation equally rich. In a comparison with the plain of Matarun, the richest part of Java, I think it would rise.28
By the early 1800s, shifting cultivation had been replaced by permanent agriculture in most of the darek, and the highlanders were said to be quite advanced in the positioning of waterworks.29 At this time, the darek was already supporting a large population, and its people had achieved considerable fluency in animal husbandry, metalworking, and carpentry, as well as in agricultural techniques.30
Summary
Rice cultivation has long been practiced in West Sumatra, and irrigation techniques in the darek have been refined over a period of centuries. Because rainfall is abundant, the incentive to develop irrigation has not been as high in West Sumatra as in many other areas of the world. Nonetheless, irrigation water was still harnessed to supplement rainfall during the rainy season, particularly in the highlands of West Sumatra. Because of the long history of irrigation in the area, we may, like Marsden and Raffles nearly two hundred years ago, assume that irrigators had, long before modern times, achieved con siderable proficiency in water management in thousands of small, local irrigation sys tems.31
This discussion of the development of irrigation in West Sumatra should not neces sarily be extended to include all other areas of Sumatra. Areas with a long history of irri gation in Sumatra are generally limited to those located in the Bukit Barisan mountains which run the length of the island. Palembang, p. 38 . 30Raffles marveled at the ingenuity of irrigation water wheels he encountered and of cattle-powered sugar presses, neither of which he had seen in Java. 31Later authors also remarked on the wealth of small streams in the region and the ingenuity of the farmers in constructing and aligning canals to bring that water to the desired locations. See, for example, P. Couperus, "Aanteekeningen omtrent de landbouwkundige nijverhied in de Residentie Padangsche Bovenlanden," TBG 5 (1856): 285-312. technology from mountainous areas in Aceh,32 North Sumatra,33 and parts of South Sumatra.34 For many of the flatter parts of the island, however, good water control is the exception rather than the rule.35
The Political and Economic Context for Irrigation Development since the Coming of the Dutch (1821 Dutch ( -1985 Economic and political forces bearing on irrigation can be traced more clearly after the Dutch occupation of the central highlands beginning in the 1820s. However, many details are still unknown and many inferences about the state and processes of early irri gation must be made based on what is known more generally about rice cultivation and local political conditions.
Beginning with the colonial era, it is useful to distinguish several historical periods in West Sumatra: (a) a time of Dutch consolidation of their political and economic con trol from 1821 until the introduction of a system of forced cultivation of coffee (the koffiestelsel) in 1847; (b) the koffiestelsel ; (c) a period of booming commodity markets ; (d) the world economic depression (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) ; (e) World War II and the struggle for independence (1943) (1944) (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) ; and (f) the post-colonial years (1950-present) .
1821-1847: Consolidation of Dutch Power in West Sumatra
Military conquest. Although the Dutch had been active for over 150 years in trading for the products of West Sumatra via west coast ports, it was not until the 1820s that they began to assume direct control over the countryside. Taking advantage of the civil unrest of the Padri war, the Dutch sided with the "traditionalists" and launched a series of military expeditions into the darek, beginning in 1822 and culminating in the defeat of the last Padri forces in 1837.36 Despite periodic uprisings during the next few years, by the 32See, for example, Pusat Pengembangan Agribisnis, "Seminar Pengembangan irigasi sederhana," Banda Aceh, December 13-15, 1987 (Jakarta: Pusat Pengembangan Agribisnis mid-1840s West Sumatra was firmly in the hands of the Dutch. During these early years the Dutch were more occupied with military and security considerations than with agri culture,^7 although in the rice sector they did temporarily ban the export of rice to lower its price and the cost of garrisoning troops.3 7 38
In order to increase military security and to redirect highland trade from traditional eastern river routes to the Dutch-controlled west coast, the Dutch built roads linking highland towns to the coast. These roads facilitated an expansion of commercial activity between the darek and the west coast which could more easily handle bulky agricultural products, such as coffee, which the colonial government wished to promote. The up grading of the Anai gorge road to accommodate wheeled transport in the 1840s also allowed easier marketing of highland rice to coastal markets.39
Early in their administration of West Sumatra, the Dutch began symbolically inaugurating the beginning of each year's rice cultivation cycle. Much like the king of Thailand who presides over the first breaking of the ground and signals the start of the cropping season for his subjects, the Dutch "graced" the annual opening of an irrigation system at Pauh near Padang. During his journey in 1818, Raffles had remarked on an elaborate irrigation ceremony here, but he failed to mention whether it was conducted wholly at the instigation of the people of Pauh, or whether it was done under the aus pices of one of the coastal princes.40 In any case, the Dutch began paying for the ceremony and took over its leadership. The Dutch Resident (Governor) with a retinue of officials and a company of soldiers attended two feasts here, one at the opening of the canal for land preparation and another two weeks later when the fields were ready for plowing.41 The authorities used the occasion to link their administration ritually to rice cultivation, so important symbolically and economically to the Minangkabau. Special ritual para phernalia with regal overtones, such as a golden hoe, were later added to enhance the occasion. The Dutch continued this tradition until the end of the colonial period.42
The encouragement of coffee cultivation. With the depletion of local gold reserves in the late 1700s the Dutch realized they would have to seek other resources to make their new territory financially solvent. Coffee trade was a logical replacement. Coffee prices were attractive, and the well-drained volcanic soil, high rainfall, and cooler weather of the highland plateaus and mountains in West Sumatra made it an ideal crop agronomically.
Coffee was not the first commercial crop the Minangkabau had grown. They had a long history of developing commercial agriculture in response to European market pos sibilities: first in pepper in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, next in cinnamon (cassia vera) and gambir, and then in coffee beginning in the 1780s. military conquest, the Dutch had been promoting coffee cultivation in the highlands by paying a commission to pangulu, traditional family clan leaders, who could deliver cof fee to Dutch buyers on the coast.44
Up to 1833, trade in coffee was completely free except for the right to export.45 How ever, the colonial authorities disliked their dependence on Minangkabau traders and planned instead.to institute a forced cultivation system for coffee, patterned on the cultuurstelsel program they had instituted in Java for coffee and sugarcane in 1830.46 With the subjugation of Sungai Pagu in southern West Sumatra in 1845, the pacification of the Minangkabau was largely complete and they began to pursue that plan in earnest.47 Coffee-and rice have different soil and drainage requirements so they do not compete for land. They do, however, compete for labor. As a result of their commercial experi ence with gold and agricultural products, by the early 1800s the Minangkabau were prob ably already paying attention to the issue of returns to labor and evaluating which crop should receive the most attention. They still needed to plant sufficient sawah to ensure self-subsistence in the absence of fluid rice markets and to maintain the prestige of the pangulu, but the Minangkabau were eager to make profits from coffee as well. In the early days of the coffee boom some regions pursued both coffee and sawah cultivation with equal vigor. For example, a Dutch official remarked in 1844 that Limapuluh Kota was not only active in cultivating coffee but also produced a rice surplus for Agam.48
Village administrative reorganization. Before colonial rule the Minangkabau village, the nagari, had been essentially autonomous. However, after their first conquests in West Sumatra, the Dutch began creating a superstructure of administration which radi cally departed from the model of the autonomous nagari.
First, beginning in 1823 each village was provided with its own head, the nagarihoofd. Above the nagari the Dutch created districts called laras, each with its own head or larashoofd,49 which were formed from clusters of adjacent nagari usually with loose adat ties. Laras were combined into regencies, and the regencies into two residencies.50 Second, the Dutch began a process of creating a power hierarchy within the nagari. One of the characteristics of Minangkabau society had been an emphasis on shared power for all pangulu in a nagari.51 Europeans, however, found this system unwieldly. For example, on his journey into the darek in 1818 Raffles lamented having to deal with "some hundreds" of equally powerful pangulu merely to get permission for his party to cross nagari lands.52 An early Dutch writer wrote, "Many times we have tried to con vince the Malays how difficult it was to deal with the suku (extended family) administration and how imperative it was to replace it with a hierarchical multi-level form of government."53 One observer later expressed the Dutch sentiment well when he wrote that "Minangkabau traditional democratic government . . . was not compatible with the modern needs of centralization and the creation of a professional cadre of civil servants."54
The Dutch found it advantageous to stratify the governance and the elite of the nagari to obtain corvee labor for road building and other projects.55 They began to insti tute regulations to increase the power of pangulu in administrative positions and to separate them from ordinary pangulu. Furthermore, a deliberate effort was made to tie the economic fortunes of these pangulu and their lineages to cooperation with the Dutch. This reduced interlineage competition for pangulu positions and resulted in an ossification of the titles, which certain families then monopolized through the genera tions.56 Later, beginning in 1888, the Dutch also tried to limit the number of pangulu, because the policy of exempting pangulu from compulsory labor precipitated a prolifera tion in pan gu lu -ships.57 This led to considerable disruption in the administration of communal lands, because new pangulu could no longer be created to represent new family segmentations, and disputes about inheritance and redistribution of land abounded.58 From early times, government-appointed pangulu began abusing their new powers,59 and abuse of power was to become an even more serious problem during the period of forced coffee cultivation.
1847-1908: Mandatory Coffee Cultivation
The koffiestelsel. In 1847, the Dutch unilaterally abrogated the "Plakaat Panjang," a document signed by Governor-General van den Bosch during his visit to West Sumatra in 1833, which promised that the Dutch government would neither interfere with tradi tional institutions nor dictate to whom the farmer must sell his crops.60 In contraven tion of this promise they introduced the koffiestelsel, a compulsory coffee cultivation and delivery system. Farmers, in all regions with suitable climate and soils, were com pelled to plant and maintain coffee trees and to sell the produce for cash at Dutch ware houses.61
The success of the koffiestelsel depended on a well-defined village administrative hierarchy, which at each level could control lower levels and be held accountable to Dutch authorities above. By 1847 the Dutch had succeeded both in pacifying the region and in creating this hierarchy.
In 1852 West Sumatra first began to show a net profit for the colonial government, mostly due to the Dutch coffee monopoly.62 However, unlike the period of relatively free trade before 1847, profits to the coffee cultivators were only one-half to one-fourth of the price the Dutch obtained on resale,63 and the government eventually had to use coercion to achieve planting and production quotas. Farmers tried to evade work in the coffee gardens, while the Dutch and village elites strained to keep them cultivating cof fee. The dynamic, market-oriented society of the precolonial era was suppressed as the economy stagnated under the koffiestelsel and the former patterns of traditional elite fluidity ossified.65 By the 1870s, coffee exports were plummeting, and although the gov ernment took such measures as increasing the percentage of the harvest the pangulu were allowed to keep for themselves,66 the system had become unworkable because farmers refused to tend their coffee trees.
Implications for sawah cultivation. During the 1850s and early 1860s West Sumatra was a modest net exporter of rice, in addition to being fully engaged in coffee produc tion.67 The Dutch, however, favored coffee because they had monopolized the coffee trade, so their profits were greater from coffee than from rice. The Dutch did not encour age coffee production to the exclusion of rice production, for sufficient rice production to supply subsistence needs was still essential to the success of the koffiestelsel. However, low rice prices also spurred coffee production.68 By restricting the rice sector to subsis tence levels and insulating it from cash transactions, the Dutch were also able to dictate low prices for coffee producers and reap large profits through exports.69 Encouraging rice exports would have undermined Dutch control over coffee by providing an alternative source of cash for the Minangkabau farmer.
On the other hand, the Dutch did wish to avoid importing rice. As early as 1847 they punished farmers who neglected rice cultivation.70 As rice production during the koffie stelsel began to fall, the Dutch experimented with rice varieties and techniques imported from Java and the Carolinas.71 However, when West Sumatra became a rice importer in 6 2 "De financieele resultaten van het bestuur der Buitenbezittingen van 1839 tot 1862," lndische Gids (henceforth IG) 33a (1890) By the early 1890s, Dutch policies had resulted in the complete disappearance of rice exports via Padang. Besides low rice prices and forced labor in the coffee gardens, from the mid-1800s a series of other Dutch policies also acted to constrain the development of the rice economy. One example was an epidemic among draft animals in 1866/1867 which resulted from corralling them to free pasture lands for coffee cultivation.* 73 The ensuing shortage of draft animals for cultivation reduced production and caused a tem porary end to rice exports from the region. Forced labor for coffee gardens, low rice prices, and a government ban on rice exports from West Sumatra also contributed to a drop in rice production.74 Further official dis crimination against rice was evidenced by the deliberate inattention to the development of eastern transportation links to Jambi and Riau, traditional markets for Minangkabau rice, and even the desire of at least one Dutch Resident in the highlands to abolish waterdriven rice mills because they facilitated the production of a surplus.75 With the opening of shipping links between Padang and non-Indonesian ports in 1879, rice could be brought in from Thailand, Burma, and Indochina, which undercut local prices.76 An other indication of the inattention of the Dutch to Minangkabau rice production is the conspicuous dearth of statistics on the production and planted area of rice in West Sumatra during the nineteenth century-a time when they were vigorously collecting detailed statistics on all crops with an export market.77 West Sumatra would not become a net exporter of rice again until the 1910s.78
The koffiestelsel and attendant rice policies affected both highland villages and vil lages in the large, flatter sawah plains. Most of the major rice-producing regions, such as Ampek Angkek Canduang near Bukittinggi; Guguk and Luhak in Limapuluh Kota; and Selayo, Cupak, and Muara Panas in Solok were relatively unaffected by the koffiestelsel.7® However, these areas suffered from the ban on rice export, and many sawah fields not needed for household consumption in the rice plains were said to have been abandoned at the end of the nineteenth century.80
Probably most directly affected by the koffiestelsel was irrigated agriculture in the small valleys surrounded by slopes suitable for coffee cultivation.81 These were areas where per capita production of coffee was highest-northern and southern Tanah Datar, northern and eastern Limapuluh Kota, northern Agam, Lubuk Sikaping, and eastern and southern Solok.82 It is also from these areas that large-scale outmigration was ob servable around the turn of the century, when profits for the coffee cultivator under the 74Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, pp. 96-98; and W. A. C. Whitlau, Governor Sumatra's Westkust, Memories van Overgave (henceforth M vO) 1926 (typescript), p. 63. Scholz (Minangkabau, p. 58) erroneously concludes that the koffiestelsel led to an increase in rice production. It is true that rice imports to Padang, which had been a feature of the late 1830s and early 1840s, were no longer necessary by the 1850s. However, the improved rice situation in imports/exports via Padang was actually an artifact of the Dutch rerouting rice exports from the darek, which had formerly gone via eastern trade routes, to the west coast as they gained control of the highlands. Cf. koffiestelsel reached a nadir.83 The labor demands of coffee cultivation and outmigration both may have siphoned off labor needed for the maintenance of irrigation systems and sawah cultivation.
A more general effect of the koffiestelsel on the Minangkabau was the eroding of a society whose social order was based primarily on communally held rice lands.84 The ex port crops promoted by the Dutch were planted on land which was individually owned, not on communally owned clan land. Profits the cultivator received from the sale of coffee, however low, were individually held and not subject to the customary restrictions which applied to most communal property.85 This contributed to an individualization of production processes and a partial turning away from communal production activities such as sawah cultivation.86
Irrigation development during the koffiestelsel. By the 1850s only limited expansion of sawah was possible in the darek.87 One author noted that by this time very few dry-rice fields still existed in most areas of the Padang highlands and almost all rice agriculture was either irrigated or rainfed sawah.88 Most of the potential irrigation in the darek had already been developed.
Irrigation development was more active in the coastal regions during this time. An 1863 government report on rice cultivation in West Sumatra noted that rainfed sawah (sawah tadah hujan) was increasingly being converted to irrigated sawah, and an 1860 re port mentioned that in Pariaman and Ulakan north of Padang new canal-building activ ity peaked that year.89 This, however, was a region unsuitable for coffee cultivation and population concentrations in the area were fairly recent phenomena.
In Java, irrigation canals had been constructed under government programs as early as the mid-1700s and large irrigation works were already being developed by the 1830s, first under the direction of the Ministry of the Interior (Binnenlandsch Bestuur) and, be ginning in 1854, under the direction of the newly formed Department of Public Works, the Departement der Burgerlijke Openbare Werken (BOW). draulic works on Java built in the mid-nineteenth century were designed to increase sugar output under the forced cultivation system.91
In West Sumatra, however, the Dutch made no direct engineering investment in irrigation during the nineteenth century, possibly because of the more limited potential of the region for irrigated export crops. The Government of West Sumatra had no irriga tion engineers a t its disposal during this time and no plans for irrigation development, other than through exhorting local leaders to extensify irrigated rice area to meet the subsistence needs of the population. All planning, construction, operation, and mainte nance of irrigation systems was left in the hands of the farmers themselves.
The Dutch did, however, indirectly influence irrigation at this time by encouraging the timely cleaning of canals and planting of rice in each district. As early as the mid1800s, they developed planting timetables known as plakaat sawah.92 The major reason for the plakaat sawah appears not to have been as a possible means of regulating water distribution among irrigation systems located along the same rivercourse, but rather to ensure that all arable land was indeed planted, and to minimize pest damage through simultaneous planting. In spite of the plakaat sawah, the Dutch blamed poor mainte nance of irrigation weirs, high turnover among Dutch supervisory officials,93 and forcing farmers to plant fields which they had little interest in cultivating94 as the causes of the rice shortages in the late nineteenth century. These, however, were only proximate causes stemming ultimately from official discrimination against rice in favor of coffee. It was not until the creation in 1905 of the Ministry of Agriculture (Departemen van Landbouw) that a government organ had the specific mandate to attend to improving food crop production and not solely to developing export crops.95
1908-1929: Laissez-faire Cultivation Policy
The lifting of the koffiestelsel and increased integration into the world economy. In 1908 the Dutch formally abandoned the koffiestelsel and allowed farmers to plant any crops they wished. Crops could be sold at prevailing prices to any private trading con cerns. To raise revenues under this new system, a direct taxation system was intro duced96 which occasioned a minor rebellion in several highland areas in 1908. 96The taxes were a 2 percent income tax on adult men, plus a slaughter tax. Corvee labor was also still re quired for public works projects. Later, in 1915, under the Nagari Ordinance, customary dues collected by the nagari, such as occasional labor service (sarayo) or occasional money contributions (iuran urang), were de facto converted into regular government taxes. See Akira Oki, "Economic Constraints, Social Change, and the Communist Uprising in West Sumatra (1926) (1927) ," in Change and Continuity in Minangkabau, ed. pp. 213, 220. 97DPK, Sejarah Sumatera Barat, tunities. The Minangkabau responded to higher profits from coffee and to new crops such as rubber and cloves.
Rice production also rebounded after the ban on rice exports from West Sumatra was rescinded in 1912.98 * In his inaugural address, Governor Ballot stressed that three things were important in rice cultivation: (1) the timely planting in accordance with the onset of the monsoon; (-2) the drying out of the fields during the dry season; and (3) non-inter ference with the farmers' choices in the marketing of the c ro p ." West Sumatra again became a net exporter of rice,100 although the Dutch themselves disagreed as to whether this was primarily due to the lifting of restrictions on the rice trade or to a reinforcement of the plakafit saxvah regulations.101 Food crop production was also supported by the establishment in 1916 of the Agricultural Extension Service (Landbouwvoorlichtingsdienst).102 Table 2 shows the status of rice imports and exports via Padang during the period 1909-1928. During the 1920s, rice exports roughly balanced imports, production keeping pace with population growth. However, we must not overestimate production in West Sumatra, for up to half of the rice exports from Padang after 1922 originated from the Kerinci area, which was directly subsumed under the administration of West Sumatra after the completion of the connecting road to Padang in 1921.103 Taking 101See, W. Steinbuch, "Bestuurscontrole op de inlandsche rijstcultuur ter Sumatra's Westkust," TBB 51 (1917): 67-74; and Smits, "Nog eens de rijstproductie," pp. 513-14. Frijling, "Bestuurscontrole," p. 97, claimed that the plakaat sawah never really fell into disuse. Nevertheless, it is apparent from Steinbuch's account that there was a tension between the Dutch administration and the farmers, who wanted to plant according to their own schedule-often so that harvest would coincide with the fasting month and the zakat (religious tax) could thus more easily be paid (Smits, "Nog eens de rijstproductie," p. 514). Another account says that gov ernment enforcement of the plakaat sawah was making farmers plant fields against their will and was causing bad harvests. See Lulofs, Naschrift van de redactie, p. 77. 102joustra, Minangkabau, p. 79. account, the area of present-day West Sumatra appears to have been a net importer of rice, as farmers took advantage of the high prices for cash crops during the 1920s.
The large expansion of the copra industry in Pariaman in the 1880s and 1890s, the rise of tobacco and gambir as commercial crops in the darek, the introduction of Robusta cof fee in the highlands in 1915, and the rapid of spread of rubber in 1920, especially in out lying districts,10? not only increased production for the market, but also heightened the vulnerability of the Minangkabau farmer to the vagaries of world prices. This was espe cially true in the minor depression during the First World War and in the recession immediately following.* 105 Such was the state of monetization of the economy that in Alahan Panjang, one of the poorest and least monetized rural areas in West Sumatra, the proportion of cash income to total income in 1926 was over 66 percent.106 However, because cash cropping had already been practiced for some time, the increased monetiza tion of the economy after 1912 may not have been the watershed Schrieke believed, but rather only an intensification of patterns already begun decades earlier.107
Rice versus other agricultural commodities. Rice agriculture had to compete for labor with coffee and other export crops. In 1927, coffee was again the most important export from Padang,108 and again, highland fields were turned over to export crops, often at the expense of pasture land needed for draft animals used in sawah cultivation.109
High prices for export crops during the 1920s encouraged farmers in outlying areas to switch from dry rice to cash crops. This was most pronounced in Indrapura and Tapan in southern Pesisir Selatan, in the Muara Labuh valley, and in Lubuk Sikaping.110 The slope and good drainage of most dry-rice fields made them highly suitable for the cash crops popular during this period. The heavy clay soils of many of the ancient sawah lands were ill-suited for these commerical crops and remained under sawah cultivation. During this time, only a moderate expansion of sawah took place, again mostly in coastal areas.111 Akira Oki makes an important point about the 1920s in West Sumatra with his ob servation that outlying areas were able to concentrate on cash-crop production precisely because the darek was able to produce a rice surplus.112 Rice production in the darek was spurred by higher prices, and marketing was facilitated by Dutch programs to expand and improve the road network. West Sumatra was developing a regional division of crop specialization in which the darek and outlying areas were joined in tighter economic interdependence. Irrigation development . The power of the pangulu and other traditional elites was primarily based on sawah, not dry cropland. This power base was again diluted during the 1920s by the increasing importance of cash cropping on non-sazoah lands.113 However, during this time the pangulu did begin to benefit from Dutch interest in actively improving sawah through measures such as irrigation development.
With the collection in 1907 of data on existing irrigation works, improvements con sidered necessary, and possibilities for extensions or new works, the Dutch for the first time began to pay specific attention to irrigation outside Java and Madura. This report, however, was considered unsatisfactory, and from 1910 to 1912 engineers conducted inquiries into irrigation on Sumatra and Sulawesi. The reports in 1914 of Ir. van Tubergen for Sumatra and Ir. van Buuren for Sulawesi led to the appointment of eight engi neers outside Java to plan and execute simple irrigation and drainage works.114 One of these engineers, J. van Tubergen, was assigned to West Sumatra,115 and the budget pro posed for the irrigation service in West Sumatra ranked highest of all the Dutch territo ries in Sumatra.116
The van Tubergen report was instrumental in charting the course of government irrigation development plans in Sumatra. According to the report, the first priority was the construction of new works for opening up new land and for converting rainfed lands into irrigated lands.117 In West Sumatra, because much of the potential irrigable land was already being irrigated, development of new irrigation works would be largely confined to outlying areas, such as Pasaman.118
Of secondary importance, according to the report, was the rehabilitation and im provement of existing works. Regarding this, the report reached several important conclusions:
(1) Improvements in existing systems will have more effect on lessening the labor burden for system maintenance and on reducing interruptions in water flow, rather than on increasing rice production itself.
(2) It will be difficult to levy irrigation fees on the farmers in government-assisted systems because it will be difficult to show improvement in rice yields. More efficient methods of water management, however, should be introduced.
(3) The improvement of existing systems should be executed with corvee or com munal labor, with cash payments borne as much as possible by those who benefit. (5) The operations and maintenance of small irrigation systems should be left in the hands of the farmers.
(6) The Dutch government should play a role in the coordination of water allocation and distribution among systems located along common rivercourses.
(7) Any intervention in existing works must be done with the utmost circumspection and consideration of the consequences. Pre-intervention preparation must include drawing good irrigation maps, including the main canals and the command areas for each canal.119 Thus, the report was clearly aware that small-scale irrigation systems were extensive, quite efficient at producing good rice yields, and should only be improved after careful consideration of the consequences. Farmers were to be involved in the rehabilitation of such works. While mobilization of corvee labor, for instance, cannot be considered a participatory approach, it is clear that the Dutch were attempting to elicit a contribution from the farmers in terms of labor, money, and materials. The reason behind this was to minimize government expenditure, but it was also consistent with current theories about the importance of contributions from farmers for the development of property rights and for encouraging the sense of ownership necessary for continued maintenance. The Dutch were not pursuing a direct investment policy which emphasized state plan ning and execution of small irrigation works without any farmer involvement.
After publication of the report, officials and businessmen who had for some years remarked on the necessity of improving irrigation works in the province, were initially enthusiastic about the measures proposed there for increasing rice output.120 However, compared to Java there was in West Sumatra at the time little corvee labor available for village roads, canals, and other public works, and most Dutch-organized labor was spent on road construction and repair, not on irrigation.121
As the van Tubergen report had predicted, the irrigation work the Dutch began out side Java in these early years was "of minor importance,"122 and consisted primarily of improving existing village irrigation wiers (bevolkingstuwdam m en) rather than con structing new ones.123 While the government made some funds available for these improvements, the projects were ". . . executed with the aid-as far as possible-of 'compulsory labour/"12F armers in Indonesia were not assessed directly for any improvements in irrigation systems.125 While farmers in Java had to pay indirectly for these improvements because the land tax was based on yields,126 those in West Sumatra paid nothing because there was essentially no land tax. In general, the Irrigation Service of the Dutch government, the Dienst Irrigatie, had three tasks at this time: (1) . . the planning and execution of new irrigation works, including technical management and water division in those irrigated areas; (2) the im provement of existing indigenous works and the assumption of regular management in those works; and (3) the provision of information and assistance for the construction or improvement of very small works."129 In West Sumatra the Dutch were primarily con cerned with the larger of the irrigation projects they undertook,130 and they assumed main systejn management of some of the larger of the previously farmer-managed sys tems,131 allowing the farmers to manage water at the tertiary level. In very small systems the Dienst Irrigatie placed no personnel at all, leaving the systems entirely in the hands of the farmers after the construction or rehabilitation of the irrigation works was com pleted. In general, for the areas outside Java and Madura, the government saw greater potential for building "scientifically constructed" small irrigation works rather than developing large irrigation facilities.132 Dutch observers felt there was a general lack of formal water users' associations in West Sumatra, especially as compared to Bali.133 One study recommended the formation of "interest groups for irrigation purposes" (" belangengemeenschappen voor bevloeiingsdoeleinden"),134 and early in the period of direct government irrigation assis tance there was some talk of forming water-users' associations (waterschappen) in the Padang environs and in Agam.135 However, this apparently was not pursued, except possibly for the strengthening of a traditional irrigation leader called the tuo banda. In any case, despite their lack of formal irrigation associations, Minangkabau farmers were noted for being good irrigators and rice cultivators.136
In general, however, the Dutch appeared to be half-hearted in developing both the physical and social infrastructure for irrigation in West Sumatra. Indeed, the delay in executing long-planned irrigation works was one of the criticisms Schrieke made in his 1927 report on the social and economic bases of Communist activity in West Sumatra.137 somehow collected through the taxation or marketing of rubber-were used to finance some small irrigation improvements designed by the government. Unfortunately, this financing system is not explained. See VKK (1938) In 1928 an irrigation committee was set up for West Sumatra which included "Agriculture Council staff," "irrigation specialists," and Minangkabau district and sub district heads, but for lack of funds the committee never followed through with any comprehensive irrigation planning.138
The World Economic Depression (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) 
: Return to Rice
Fall in commodity prices. The world economic depression begun in 1929 rapidly spread to the Netherlands Indies, and plummeting commodity prices soon sparked a retrenchment to subsistence-oriented agriculture throughout the archipelago. West Sumatra, too, experienced drastic declines in the prices of cash crops. For example, the price of coffee in 1936 was only 15 percent of its 1929 price; copra in 1938 was only 6 per cent of its 1929 price; and rubber in 1933 had fallen to only 8 percent of its 1929 price.13R ice prices also fell sharply, although not as drastically as those of export crops. By 1933, the price had fallen to f3.75 per picol (62.5 kg), less than one-third the fl2 per picol price before the onset of the depression. Prices stayed very low throughout the mid-1930s and only began edging upward in 1937.140 During the depression, local trade declined most in the areas where cash cropping had been strongest, although it fared somewhat better in the rice centers.141
Rice production. The increase in rice production before the depression had been pri marily a rebound from the unfavorable conditions for rice cultivation during the koffiestelsel, and did not represent any real advances in rice production technology. During the depression, low rice prices had a particularly dampening effect on rice production. This can be seen in rice trade figures for the period 1929-1938 in Table 3 . Table 3 . Rice Exports and Imports, West Sumatra, 1929 -1938 Period 1929 -1932 1934 -1935 1936 -1938 Yearly Average (metric tons) By the mid-1930s, yearly paddy production in West Sumatra was only averaging 350,000 tons, not much higher than estimated production for the region back in the 138Oki, "Social Change," p. 163. l3 9 VKK, various issues. 140Ibid. 141Oki, "Social Change," p. 142.
1850s, in spite of some limited increases in sawah area.142 The poor showing in produc tion figures, however, may be a combination of the stored reserves from Kerinci which had come on to the market in the 1920s being exhausted, and reduced marketing of rice due both to low prices and the need to feed a population swollen by residents returning to the villages as their business ventures in urban areas floundered. Finally, in the late 1930s and early 1940s rice prices rose and the harvest increased to approximately 500,000 tons of paddy. Even with the better harvests, however, West Sumatra remained a minor rice importer.
Irrigation development (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) . With the collapse of the export economy in the 1930s, the subsistence-oriented shift in the economy favored sawah over other crops.143 Traditional "leaders began using slogans such as "back to rice" in areas formerly heavily involved with export crops. Sawah was worked more intensively during the 1930s than it had been during the 1920s, and cases of land pawning, such as Schrieke had decried, declined as the role of sawah assumed greater economic importance.144
This renewed reliance on sawah provided an incentive to invest further in irriga tion. However, such new investment had to come mostly from the village, as the Dutch government had little money to spend on irrigation during the 1930s, with revenues cut sharply by the decline in the export prices of agricultural commodities.145 * For example, in 1935 the government of West Sumatra requested 150,000 guilders for irrigation pro jects in the province but was only allocated 5,000 guilders.145 Compared to Java, Dutch expenditures on irrigation in other areas were small.147
What Dutch assistance did come was still predominantly directed toward small-scale works and a few medium-scale irrigation works, although Dutch engineers began pro viding technical assistance to those nagari that requested help with designing irrigation rehabilitation or construction. The responsibility for the costs of all labor and materials in such projects, however, rested with the nagari itself.148
Most of the larger irrigation works which the Dutch did build on Sumatra during the 1930s were not located in West Sumatra.149 These works, which were predominantly new systems constructed for Javanese transmigrants in Lampung, Bengkulu, and South 142Average yearly production of paddy for the period 1853-1863 was about 315,000 tons of paddy. See Veth, Aardrijkskundig ert statistisch woordenboek, p. 732; and VKK, various issues. Unless noted otherwise, all figures in this study represent only the present-day territory of West Sumatra. l4 3 See, for example, Mohamad Said, "Irikasi atau Pengairan di Onderafdeeling Fort van der C a p e lle n Tani 5,10 (April 1932): 110. 144Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, pp. 115-16; and Oki, "Social Change," p. 129. 145B. H. F. van Heuven (Resident, Sumatra's Westkust), MvO, 1934, pp. 175-76,199-200. Said, "Irikasi," p. 110. Oki ("Social Change," p. 160 Sumatra, often consumed more than half of the total budget for irrigation development outside Java.150 The Dutch made only very limited efforts to move Javanese farmers to West Sumatra, however, and no large irrigation systems for transmigrants were com pleted there.151
As trustees of communal sawah, the position of village elites, the pangulu, was en hanced by the population's increased reliance on sawah. At the local level, the pangulu took the lead in galvanizing irrigation improvements during the depression, sometimes even using their personal funds.152 The pangulu took care of seeing to the needs of all the nagari inhabitants, both long-standing residents and those returning from failed ventures elsewhere. These activities enhanced the prestige of the pangulu, who had been under assault by the Communists and "modernizers" (kaum muda) during the export boom years of the 1920s.153 The phrase "retain the adat and you will not go hungry" supported this relegitimization of the role of the pangulu in the WAgArz.154
During this time there may have also been a re-emergence of "traditional" irrigation leaders, usually called tuo banda, although there is insufficient evidence to say whether the term predates Dutch times or was created or popularized by the Dutch themselves.155 Some documents imply that in selected areas, especially around Solok, tuo banda were installed on the initiative of the Dutch in an attempt to improve maintenance of irriga tion systems and to better coordinate the plakaat sawa/ i.156 Dutch concern about the via bility of the institution of the tuo banda was another indication of the renewed impor tance of sawah during the depression years.
1943-1950: The Japanese Interregnum and the Struggle for Independence
Rice production. During the Japanese occupation of West Sumatra from 1942 to 1945 rice production fell sharply, due to a combination of lack of male labor and, beginning in 1944, forced procurement of up to 50 percent of the rice harvest for the Japanese armed 150Some examples in Sumatra of irrigation systems for transmigrants from Java are Way Sekampong (20,000 ha) and Sukadana (33,400 ha) in Lampung; Perbo (3,500 ha) in Bengkulu; and Aer Komering (12,500 ha) and Lubuk Linggau (3,000 ha) in South Sumatra. See the "Waterstaat," in the yearly issues of Indisch Verslag, Tekst van het verslag van bestuur en stoat van Nederlandsch-lndie over het jaar (1930 van Nederlandsch-lndie over het jaar ( -1938 (The Hague: Algemeene Landsdrukkerij, yearly, 1931 to 1939 . 15lTwo irrigation projects in West Sumatra for transmigrants were: (1) an investigation for a new system in Indrapura, near Bengkulu (see VKK [1935] : 82); and (2) Sumatra (1927 Sumatra ( -1933 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971 ). 154Oki, "Social Change," p. 174. 155I have found no reference to the tuo banda before the late 1920s. This is curious as the Dutch were keen ethnographers of the Minangkabau. Either no one examined traditional irrigation systems in detail before the 1920s, or the title tuo banda was created by the Dutch. 155Isrin, "Sedikit tentang dihidoepkan kembali Toeo Banda' dibagian Solok, " SCPT 7,12 (1934): 139; VKK (1935): 82; van Heuven, MvO, p. 178. forces.157 During the Japanese interregnum irrigation systems received little attention, the plakaat sawah was not followed, and the fields were not well tended.158
Similarly, during the struggle for independence against the Dutch (1945 Dutch ( -1949 , labor was often not available in the right places at the right time to produce good crops. Inter views with village leaders in several parts of the province indicate that many irrigation systems were not maintained after the men fled to the hills to fight the guerrilla war.159 Much of the burden of rice cultivation was borne by the Minangkabau women, and there was little incentive or opportunity to produce rice above subsistence levels. West Sumatra continued to require rice imports during the 1940s.160
1950-1985: The Post-Colonial Years
Expansion of sawah area. The years since independence have been marked by a slow expansion of irrigated area and a large increase in rice production in West Sumatra. Some of this expansion of irrigated area has been achieved through the development of new lands, but most of it has been the result of: (a) improvements in irrigation facilities enabling rainfed sawah (sawah tadah hujan or sawah banda langik) to become irrigated sawah ; and (b) the increase in the cropping index from better water provision and short maturing seed varieties. Table 4 shows the development of rice area and the cropping index in West Sumatra.
Based on these figures, the expansion in terms of land area committed to sawah dur ing the last seventy years has been only about 40,000 to 50,000 ha. As pointed out earlier, the expansion that did take place occurred primarily in fringe areas. Figures from 1969 indicate that almost all land suitable for new sawah was located at the very borders of West Sumatra. Tanah Datar in the heartland, for example, showed no possibility of sawah expansion.161
There is less information on the proportion of irrigated to rainfed sawah during this period. One estimate from the mid-1920s places irrigated sawah in West Sumatra at about 137,000 ha with an additional 60,000 ha rainfed sawah .162 In 1986, the area of irri gated sawah was listed as 158,000 ha and that of rainfed sawah as 62,000 ha.163 Thus, during the last sixty years there appears to have been no change in the amount of rainfed sawah but an increase of about 21,000 ha in irrigated sawah . This has occurred through the conversion of rainfed sawah into irrigated sawah , especially at the initiative of the Dutch and Indonesian governments, and an equal expansion of new rainfed sawah in remote areas of the province. Irrigation development. By 1954, government programs had improved irrigation facilities for only about 15,000 ha of sawah .164 Although the provincial government gave some minor assistance to small-scale irrigation in the form of materials in the mid1950s,165 political turmoil and economic instability prevented any significant rehabilita tion of irrigation in West Sumatra from 1950 until 1966. In fact, during that time the irrigated area of systems under government management actually decreased from 45,000 ha to 29,000 ha.166 This problem beset not only West Sumatra, but all Indonesia, as pre-1965 governments neglected to maintain irrigation systems.167
The spread of the HYVs. As a major importer of rice, Indonesia was quick to adopt modern seed varieties (HYVs) in the mid-1960s, when they first became available. Before the advent of this green revolution, all sawah in West Sumatra was only single cropped to rice, and usually no unirrigated crop was grown in the sawah. Yet by 1985, the crop ping index for all sawah had risen to 1.48. That is, on average, each piece of sawah land was being harvested nearly one and one-half times per year. Assuming that rainfed sawah is still only single cropped,168 then the cropping index for rice for irrigated sawah alone had reached 1.67 by 1985. Planting a second non-rice crop on sawah is still not common in West Sumatra.169
This important increase in cropping intensity has been made possible in part because irrigation water is available for modem seed varieties. The long history of irrigation development in \Vest Sumatra and its abundant water resources have enabled singlecropped irrigated land to move to double-cropped irrigated land with little change in the physical structures of many irrigation systems. Furthermore, in formerly rainfed coastal areas the new seeds have provided an increased incentive to developing new canal sys tems for irrigated sawah .
But the success of the HYVs in West Sumatra also owes much to a good match be tween a new technology and a local culture which had reached technological rather than social limits to increased production. By the mid-1960s very little expansion of sawah was possible in West Sumatra, and, with the varieties the Minangkabau farmer possessed at the time, little could be done to improve yields. First the Dutch170 and later the Japan ese,171 had found difficulty in surpassing the rice cultivation techniques the Minangkabau were already using. What was needed to increase production were not incremental adjustments to existing techniques, but radically new technologies. The HYVs, first developed in the mid-1960s at the International Rice Research Institute in Los Banos in the Philippines, provided those technolgies.172
The spread of the HYVs in West Sumatra proceeded rapidly under government pro grams aimed at disseminating the seeds, fertilizers, credit, and cultivation information needed to take advantage of the genetic potential of the new stock.173 Table 5 shows the coverage of the programs disseminating HYV technology in West Sumatra. As the table shows, by 1974 almost half of all sawah was included in some rice inten sification program, and by 1982 almost all harvested sawah area in the province was involved to some extent. Areas which were highly dependent on rice for their main source of income, even those located in isolated areas, adopted the new varieties more quickly and completely than those areas less dependent on rice.174
As a result of the rapid adoption of the HYVs, West Sumatra has again begun exporting rice, predominantly to neighboring Jambi and Riau.175 Using a figure of about 160 kg per capita annual consumption of milled rice (303 kg paddy) in West Sumatra,176 we can see that by 1985 paddy production (1,495,000 tons) well exceeded consumption (1,135,000 tons) for the 3.74 million inhabitants of West Sumatra, leaving considerable quantities available for export.177
Although the program experienced some initial difficulties in conceptualization and implementation, the social and economic consequences of the HYVs in West Sumatra bear little resemblance to the negative consequences that reportedly sometimes occurred on Java.178 Incomes of farmers adopting the HYVs increased relative to those of non adopters, despite the fact that production costs with HYVs were much higher.179 As farmers became more familiar with the new technology their yields and income increased further. Significantly, the net result also tended not to alter the existing distri bution of income in those areas.180
This favorable result may be attributed to a number of factors. Of primary importance is the nature of landholding in West Sumatra. As in many other areas in Asia, larger landholders adopted the new varieties more rapidly than small farmers.181 However, early adopters were not able to buy up the land of non-adopters using profits from the new technology. Sawah in West Sumatra is subject to strict traditional laws and is not easily sold by the individual. This meant that, in the early days of the HYVs, those with out the resources to take the risks of adopting an as-yet-unproven technology were able to adopt a ^wait-and-see" attitude, until government programs were sufficiently devel oped for the small farmer to have more equal access to inputs.
Another important reason for the favorable income distribution after the introduc tion of HYVs was that they were accompanied by little labor-displacing technology in West Sumatra. Mechanization of land preparation has been for the most part impractical on sawah because of the steep terraces in many of the principal rice-producing districts. Harvest technology has also not changed. On Java, a small blade cupped in the hand called an ani-ani was used to harvest rice in a very labor-intensive fashion. After the introduction of the HYVs this was often replaced by the less labor-intensive sickle.182 In West Sumatra there was a version of the ani-ani, locally called the tuai, but its use was generally restricted to padi ladang, unterraced rainfed rice, and the sickle had been in general use for harvesting sawah long before the introduction of HYVs. As a result, the total demand for labor in West Sumatra rose dramatically with the larger harvests and the greater number of harvests per year,183 turning some areas previously afflicted with surplus agricultural labor into labor-deficit areas.184 Mechanization in the rice-produc tion cycle has most commonly been in the form of simple threshing machines. These have developed in response both to the larger harvests and because less time is available for threshing, now that farmers are eager to begin soaking their land again and preparing for a second crop.
In the last three years, however, with the achievement of self-sufficiency in rice in Indonesia, rice prices have been unstable and often low, and rice farmers all over the country face new difficulties in earning a living from sawah . The impact of this on the construction, operation, and maintenance of irrigation systems in West Sumatra is not yet clear. 1 (1975): 17-35; and Y. Hayami and A. Hafid, "Rice Harvesting and Welfare in Rural Java," BIES 15,2 (1979): 94-112. 183Bonad, Griine Revolution, p. 89 . 184During my fieldwork in Lintau, Tanah Datar, farmers mentioned that before the HYVs they used to go to Limapuluh Kota to work as agricultural laborers after their own harvest. Now, with the HYVs and multiple cropping, they stay at home and actually must import labor from Tanjung Barulak, an area with poor water resources, to help with their own fields. gation systems and the rehabilitation and improvement of exisiting ones. Indeed, irriga tion improvement was a necessary concomitant of the government's plans for maximizing the potential of the HYVs. And, as in other spheres of development, the government designated itself the "prime mover" in the effort to improve irrigation facilities. During the first four Five-Year Development Plans (1967 -1986 , rehabilitation of existing systems and construction of new systems were given the highest priority in irrigation development. Central government commitment to irrigation has been extensive. As an example, in 1974/75, 44 percent of all subsidies from the central government to West Sumatra were earmarked for irrigation construction and maintenance.185 By 1982, 156,000 ha were included under Department of Public Works (PU) irrigation programs in West Sumatra.186 While this figure overestimates actual area, it does serve to illustrate the magnitude of the government's involvement in irrigation development in the province as compared to that of only fifteen years earlier.187
The number of systems with PU involvement in West Sumatra has quadrupled from 261 systems in 1967 to almost 1,000 in 1980.188 Nearly all of these systems were developed initially by farmers, many of them centuries ago. After they were assisted by the government they became de facto government systems, and the government now considers the structures to be government assets. According to PU figures, 59 percent of these government-assisted systems irrigate less than 150 hectares, accounting for 22 per cent of total government-assisted sawah area. Another 26 percent of PU systems irrigate command areas of between 151 and 300 hectares. Only 10 perecent of all PU systems in West Sumatra have designed command areas larger than 500 hectares.189 The scope of government assistance to irrigation in the province is now far greater than under either colonial rule or the early post-independence government.
With the exception of certain of the largest systems, the farmers in governmentassisted irrigation systems, are, in effect, free to pursue any cropping schedule they wish. During the 1950s the post-colonial government in West Sumatra attempted to continue the Dutch plakaat sawah tradition, but violating the plakaat carried no sanctions, as it had under the Dutch, and eventually a formal planting schedule was dropped.190 The agricultural extension service still continues to promote simultaneous cropping to avoid pest problems, and a cropping schedule is sometimes issued from the Kabupaten-level civil administration, but the farmers are not sanctioned if they disregard the guidelines. Government-assisted improvements in irrigation systems have been important in the drive for higher yields in West Sumatra, and the benefits of those improvements, at least in some systems, have more than offset the costs.191 Irrigation development pro grams in West Sumatra have not, however, been without problems, many of which stem from the difficulty in balancing the need to attend to the specific needs of individ ual irrigation systems with the urgent need to develop rapidly, and rehabilitate on a massive scale, the physical irrigation infrastructure, which had deteriorated through neglect and lack of funds during the 1950s and early 1960s. The pressing need to increase food production, and the availability of petro-dollars and international grants and loans to finance agricultural programs, beginning in the late 1960s, led the government to em bark on irrigation programs that emphasized a top-down approach. Government offi cials identified systems for rehabilitation; irrigation officials or private contractors pre pared the designs; contractors executed the construction of the rehabilitated facilities; and the irrigation staff was then sometimes placed in the system to perform key functions, such as operating gates and desilting canals. Farmers were often not consulted about these decisions, and they were sometimes treated as the object rather than the subject of development. This can be characterized as a "direct" investment approach.192
The results of direct investment were sometimes unfavorable. First was the quality of construction techniques used by outside contractors, which PU staff itself was inadequate to supervise. Inevitably many structures were built whose life was far shorter than anticipated. For example, contractors often either used inferior materials or failed to follow design specifications.
A second set of problems involved designs, which were standardized wherever pos sible. In some cases, these designs assumed a level of management that the farmers were not willing to provide. For example, the government design provides adjustable gates at the headworks of many systems, which assumes that someone will be there to operate the gates. In designing the intake, the point where the canal takes water from the river, however, the farmer design emphasizes prevention of excessive water coming into the canal, not by the use of rising stem gates, but by the provision of a portal through which the water must flow-when the water is low the portal does not obstruct the water, and when the river water is very high, the portal blocks too much water from coming into the canal and destroying it. With this design, no personnel are needed to monitor the intake. This is one example of how a farmer design was devised to regulate water auto matically, while the government design required placing of a full-time or part-time em ployee to watch over the gates.
A third problem derived from the specification of structures to be constructed or rehabilitated. Government projects sometimes paid little attention to what the farmers wanted done to their system. For example, the government would sometimes empha size headworks construction even in hilly areas where farmers gave canal lining a higher priority.
A fourth set of problems arose because in many cases only selected irrigation systems along a rivercourse were improved. Sometimes the improvements enabled selected 191Asnawi and Shand, "Economic Impact of Irrigation," p. 119. 192For a discussion of "direct" versus "indirect" investment strategies in irrigation, see E. Walter Coward, Jr., "Direct or Indirect Alternatives for Irrigation Investment and the Creation of Property," in Irrigation Invest ment, Technology, and Management Strategies for Development, ed. K. William Easter (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986). systems to divert more water from the rivercourse than had previously been possible using simpler headworks. This changed the balance of intersystem water distribution, and often led to complaints from downstream systems that improved systems upstream had begun diverting too much water.
A fifth constellation of problems revolved around the farmers' increasing reliance on the government to improve and maintain the assisted systems. Whereas before assistance the farmers used to maintain the systems themselves through various forms of collective labor, after assistance they tended either to rely on resident PU personnel, or to wait for PU to provide periodic or incidental assistance when the system needed attention. The farmers' tendency to wait for PU to do a job they could do themselves was understandable because PU now considered the rehabilitated system as a government system. Thus, improving the physical aspects of formerly farmer-managed irrigation systems inadvertently created a dependency relationship between the farmers and the government, in which local mobilization of resources and action was retarded by the government assistance itself. This situation was often compounded by the fact that little attention was paid to the development of viable water users' associations in the rehabilitated systems.
Many of these deficiencies are a consequence of not involving farmers in decisions concerning their irrigation systems. In its haste to develop the physical infrastructure, the central government in the late 1960s chose to operate through a standardized direct approach which did not capitalize on local knowledge of conditions, needs, and desires.193 Involving farmers in the decision-making process could have assisted in identifying priorities for assistance, in developing designs appropriate to local social and ecological conditions, in involving farmers in the construction of their own system, and in strengthening farmer ownership and responsibility for subsequent maintenance of the system. Such a participatory approach, however, does require intensive communciation between irrigation officials and fanners and the skills to view irrigation as a sociotechnical set of phenomena, not just merely as a physical infrastructure.
Experiments with such "indirect" or "participatory" approaches to irrigation devel opment have been few in West Sumatra in recent years. Where tried, however, this approach has proven to be less costly than the traditional direct approach, and farmers are likely to have a greater stake in maintaining the system after construction, because they were involved in the entire process.194 At present, however, PU is ill-equipped to attempt this on an extensive scale.
The recent fiscal crisis has spurred efforts to redefine the government's role in irriga tion development and to move toward a more indirect investment approach. Since the decline in oil and gas revenues in the mid-1980s, the national budget has no longer been . Also, three irrigation systems were improved in West Sumatra by PU, in conjunction with funding from USAID, using a more participatory approach. For a description of the approach, see LP3ES, "Laporan akhir proyek percontohan pembinaan partisipasi petani dalam pembangunan dan pengelolaan irigasi sedcrhana melalui community organizer dalam rangka high performance sederhana irrigation system (HPS1S)," Jakarta: LP3ES. able to support the rising budgets for operations and maintenance needed by PU for the large number of systems it has taken over. Consequently, the priorities for irrigation development under the fifth Five-Year Development Plan (1987 -1992 lay more stress on developing efficient operations and maintenance procedures and on collecting water users' fees than on new construction and rehabilitation. In line with this change of pol icy, as part of a large irrigation sector loan from the World Bank initiated in 1987, PU has also begun a program of turning over all irrigation systems under 500 ha to farmer water management groups within the next fifteen years. Many of these systems will receive construction assistance before the turnover. However, in contrast with its earlier approach, PU is now experimenting with approaches involving farmers in the planning, design, and execution phases of construction. In addition, PU plans to provide assistance to farmer groups to encourage water users' associations which could operate and main tain the irrigation systems, with a minimum of government assistance after the turnover. One of the major challenges PU now faces in West Sumatra is to develop these water users' groups, given that the traditional elite, which might normally consti tute the backbone of such organizations, has been weakened, in part by the government's own past non-participatory approaches to development.
It is interesting to note that, in many ways, the indirect style of assistance would mark a return to the policies of the Dutch toward small-scale irrigation during the last three decades of their rule. However, in contrast to the reasons behind the colonial policies, which were aimed largely at minimizing government expenditure, the present gov ernment's turnover policy, while also spurred by financial pressures, is in addition apparently taking into account the long-term maintenance benefits to be derived from involving farmers in the process of planning, design, and execution. Now that the day-to-day management of many individual systems is being turned back to water users' groups, PU is also beginning to reformulate its role at the rivercourse level. This, too, recalls earlier Dutch policies; the van Tubergen report of seventy-five years ago recommended that the Dutch government play a role in rivercourse manage ment, but not become involved in the management of small systems themselves.
Despite these positive steps, in West Sumatra irrigation development must still take place within an administrative environment which is increasingly ill-equipped to deal with irrigation as the management of a scarce resource for which different groups in creasingly compete. There have been many changes in the administration of the nagari since World War II, involving the relationship between the wali nagari, the successor of the Dutch kepala negeri, and various forms of adat and people's representative councils at this level.195 The most important of these administrative changes, however, came with the enactment of a law in 1979 which eliminated the nagari as a political unit.196
The nagari had been composed of territorial units called jorong. These jorong were not independent entities and only had their fullest social meaning within the context of the nagari. Under the new law, each of these jorong was converted into an independent administrative unit called the desa. Thus, the 543 nagari of West Sumatra became 3,537 /1968 / . 196Undang-undang no. 5,1979 . The implementation of this law took place between 1980 and 1982. desa,197 which now form the lowest political unit, directly beneath the kecamatan in the administrative hierarchy. Each desa is headed by a kepala desa, who receives a low salary directly from the government. Although the kepala desa is selected through consultation of the pangulu of the jorong, his appointment is subject to ratification by the govern ment, just as the Dutch reserved the right to approve or veto the choice of the kepala negeri.198 In conjunction with the clan elders (ttiniak mamak), the wali nagari used to coordi nate and promote all important development projects in the nagari, whether they were initiated by the government, by individuals or organizations, or by the nagari council.199 Now, the wali nagari and his staff have been eliminated. Property which was owned by the nagari administration is being turned over to the Kerapatan Adat Nagari (KAN),200 a consultative body composed of the men who occupy positions of traditional family lead ership.201 Many problems have arisen with the breakup of the nagari into desa. The first is an increased administrative burden on the camat, who has to monitor the greatly increased number of political units under him. (As an example, the 9 nagari in Kecamatan Lintau Buo in Tanah Datar were broken up into 86 desa after the reorganization.) Rather than use nagari administration as an intermediate level to remedy this problem, the govern ment has decided to create more kecamatan and thus reduce their size. Unlike the wali nagari, who was always chosen from among the niniak mamak within his own nagari, the camat is normally an outsider and therefore more removed from village-level con ditions.
Although the creation of the desa was not supposed to eliminate the nagari as a social adat unit ("kesatuan masyarakat hukum adat"),202 the relationship between the nagari and the desa has not been entirely clear under the new system. The KAN (or Nagari Adat Council) was conceived as a way of dealing with nagari issues now that the position of wali nagari has been abolished. According to Perda 13, the duties of the KAN are: (1) to manage affairs which deal with hereditary titles, and prop erty;203 (2) to settle civil cases regarding adat and customary law; (3) to strive to bring peace and legal authority to disputes among the members of the nagari; (4) to promote the culture of the members of the nagari in order to preserve the regional culture and enrich the treasurehouse of national culture; (5) to inventory, guard, maintain, and uti lize the property of the nagari for the benefit of the members of the nagari; (6) to organize and coordinate the legal polity according to adat in each nagari, and to promote a high sense of family among the members of the nagari, increasing the level of social aware ness and community spirit; and (7) to represent the nagari, and to act in its name, in all 197SBDA, 1987, p. 23. 198This change was preceded by the establishment of unpaid kepala jorong or jorong heads under the nagari administration. See, Surat Keputusan Gubernur Sumatera Barat, 24 December, 1974 , No, 155/G.S.B./1974 . iyySee, for example, Harsja Bachtiar, 'Twelve Sumatran Villages" (MA thesis, Cornell University, 1959), pp. 128,132. ®The turning over of nagari property is still taking place. The implementation of this ordinance is some times slowed by confusion over what exactly constitutes nagari property.
Olperaturan Daerah (Perda) no. 13/1983. 202Cf. the Dutch term "sociale gemeenschap." 203or p USak0' legal cases inside or outside the courts in matters regarding the rights and property of the nagari.
Apart from acting as a repository of knowledge and instruction on nagari adat, the primary function of the KAN then becomes the supervision of nagari property. How ever, in the government view, this "supervision" is normally limited to the utilization and inheritance of that property according to adat. Property improvement falls within the sphere of "pembangunan" ("development"), which in practice is normally consid ered the province of government agencies, not of adat institutions or adat leaders. Thus, while desiring the cooperation of adat institutions and leaders in promoting its devel opment plans, the government has effectively removed much of the economic content from the concept of adat.2Qi Under the Dutch, adat leaders were allowed to retain a role in the administration of adat, which although it no longer encompassed the overall organization of society, did include the organization of the economic base of both the European-dominated sector and village economy sectors.* 205 Under the new develop ment programs, however, adat leaders are increasingly left in control of adat merely in marginalized (that is, non-economic) sectors. The new leaders in the economic sector are not adat leaders but rather government civil servants.
There are several ramifications for irrigation in this administrative reorganization. First is the proliferation of administrative units now served by irrigation systems. For example, in Kecamatan Lintau Buo there were previously eleven government-assisted systems which irrigated land in more than one nagari. With the administrative breakup of the nagari, eight additional government systems now cross administrative boundaries. Some small systems now irrigate land in seven, eight, even nine desa. The shift in political power from the niniak mamak to the desa headmen, means that there is a tendency to parochialize the interests of the various desa served by these systems, raising the potential for conflict in management of the irrigation system. Second, with the proliferation of desa, the problem of coordinating water use between systems utilizing the same river becomes heightened. The xvali nagari can no longer coordinate intersystem water allocation and distribution, while the bailiwick of the kepala desa is too small and that of the camat too large to handle intersystem water allocation. Intersystem coordination of water has always been one of the weaker aspects of Minangkabau irrigation,206 and this administrative change has exacerbated the prob lem.
A third problem caused by the breakup of the nagari has been the reduction of man power available for communal work projects (gotong royong). The institutions to mobi lize labor on a nagari level have now been severely weakened, promoting an atomiza tion of labor interests and a tendency to restrict gotong royong to the desa level. In the 1920s each nagari had an average of about 600 working men who could be mobilized for gotong royong by the niniak mamak and wali nagari.2®' With the breakup of the nagari, landowners in one desa often have their land in another, so that one desa may have much labor for gotong royong but little land;208 while other desa, with large amounts of sawah owned by people outside the desa may now find themselves with much land but little labor. Some desa now have as few as 30 able-bodied men,209 and the diversion of desa labor for government-sponsored gotong royong projects such as village and roadside beautification programs further reduces the available labor for productive projects such as irrigation.
Conclusions
During the last 200 years, the history of rice cultivation in West Sumatra has been one of commoditization in fits and starts. Although in precolonial times limited quanti ties of rice had been exported to eastern Sumatra via river routes and to the western coast via overland trails, it was not until Dutch colonization and improvements in road and rail transportation that large rice movements between districts and regions became practical. However, the potential for exporting rice over these new routes was fettered by the koffiestelsel. Whereas, given its natural resources and skilled rice farmers, West Sumatra should have been exporting rice, in fact, by the end of the nineteenth century it had become a rice importer. The irrigation infrastructure developed by Minangkabau farmers was capable of growing surplus rice, but early Dutch policies which intentionally kept the rice economy as much as possible on a subsistence basis, undermined develop ment of a vigorous economy which might have otherwise burgeoned under a rice sur plus situation, thus restricting West Sumatra's potential for agricultural development.
The world trade depression in the 1930s forced a return to rice and other basic food crops. Although the Dutch at that time actively promoted rice cultivation, gains in pro duction were offset by the increasing population. The rice import situation continued to worsen in the post-independence years.
Since the advent of the new rice varieties in the 1960s and 1970s, total rice production in West Sumatra has tripled. The scope for development of new sawah has been very limited in most of the province for at least a century, and higher yields and multiple cropping have been responsible for the huge increase in production-and for important increases in farmer incomes as well. Rice is now not only an article of consumption, but also a major article of trade, and the monetization of the rice production process has caused a major change in village economies. West Sumatra has now finally become the regional exporter of rice it should have been long ago.
The encouraging fact that production and incomes have increased, however, must be tempered by the assessment of the institutional development which should accompany such gains. Nagari members under the leadership of pangulu, acting as either lineage heads or nagari elders, were apparently responsible for developing the region's irrigation in precolonial times. With the possible exception of activities by the Padri in the early nineteenth century, there are no confirmed records of any supra-nagari political power being responsible for irrigation development during the precolonial period.
Yet this strong base of authority and cohesion in irrigated agriculture has been under continnual assault since colonial times. The Dutch occupation cost the nagari its auton omy. The equality of the pangulu was eroded as the Dutch elevated some pangulu above mamak and other landowners from those nagari, but within the two desa proper there are only 6 and 15 ha of sawah respectively. 2^F or example, Desa Duwek, Nagari Tanjung Bonai, Lintau Buo, Tanah Datar. others to facilitate colonial governance from Padang and Batavia. Limits were put on the creation of new pangulu, while the Dutch also invested the existing pangulu with power far beyond that conferred by adat. The integrity of the pangulu was strained as the Dutch government pressured them to force their people to grow export crops for Dutch monopolies, and many pangulu became tools of the colonial administration. By the time the Dutch belatedly tried to separate the functions of the civil administration from adat leadership, the prestige of the pangulu had been severely eroded. Paradoxically, in trying to strengthen the indigenous Minangkabau administrative system, the Dutch under mined the very foundations of adat-based authority.210
Although Indonesian governments since independence have wished to preserve the adat functions of the pangulu, they have inadvertently continued the process of "de-adatization" of leadership at the village level. Issues of "development"-including irriga tion-have been increasingly moved into the hands of civil servants and out of the hands of traditional leaders. Past linkages between civil and adat roles are being struc turally weakened as well, as evidenced by the recent abolition of the nagari as a unit of political administration. These events have placed traditional leadership in a passive role and have not encouraged dialogue between adat heads and the agents of change from government ministries. With specific regard to irrigation development, the lack of consultation which characterizes many state programs has led to a further dimunition of the prestige of the pangulu. The irrigated rice fields of the lineage, the traditional trusteeship of adat leadership, are in many cases being developed by a government which is not directly accountable to the irrigators whose fields its policies affect.
The conceptual and practical disadvantages encountered from this direct investment style in small irrigation systems-and the rising operations and maintenance budget required to operate and maintain them-have recently led the government to begin a program of returning government-assisted small-scale systems to farmer water-user groups. It is hoped that this new policy will enable farmers to do what they do best-irri gate-while at the same time reorient the government's irrigation department away from the role of an administrative and executive agency and toward one of a service agency. While farmer water groups are still in a tenuous legal position, this new policy does represent a significant and positive first step in decentralizing some state control over agricultural development and moves toward empowering farmers to make deci sions which affect their livelihood. Nevertheless, with the weakening of institutions for handling inter-Hagan and intersystem water distribution, intergroup competition for irrigation water in West Sumatra is likely to continue to be a major problem. 
